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A “Minor” Problem with Oil and Gas Company
Settlement Agreements
INTRODUCTION
Imagine being eight years old and sitting alongside your dad at your
first Louisiana State University football game. The night in Tiger Stadium
is off to a great start: the crowd is rambunctious, the weather is great, and
the Tigers are winning. Suddenly, the night takes a turn for the worse.
After another LSU touchdown, one of the players runs into the goalpost,
causing it to collapse backwards into the section of seats behind the end
zone. One of the beams comes crashing down onto you and your dad,
causing major injuries to your legs.
Following a lengthy lawsuit, your parents enter into a settlement
agreement on your behalf. While the settlement provides enough money
to cover your medical expenses and necessary care going forward, the
settlement benefits come with a hefty price. The agreement also includes
a confidentiality agreement—one that bars you and your family from
discussing any aspect of LSU football for the rest of your lives.
Football is entrenched in the culture of Southern Louisiana. It is not
merely a sport for residents—it is a way of life. Imagine growing up and
not being able to discuss what others talk about every day; something that
you and your family have grown to love and accept as a major part of life.
In May of 2011, a similar situation occurred with two children, Nathan
and Alyson Hallowich. Nathan and Alyson were nine and five years of age
respectively when their parents, Chris and Stephanie Hallowich, filed a
lawsuit against oil companies for damages resulting from hydraulic
fracturing1 (fracking) conducted near their property.2 Upon agreement to
settle, the Hallowich parents signed a settlement agreement containing a
non-disclosure agreement that prohibited the Hallowich family, including
Nathan and Alyson, from discussing any of the facts, elements, or contents
of the case for the rest of their lives.3 Essentially, the agreement served to
Copyright 2017, by TYLER WHITE
1. EPA, Natural Gas Extraction–Hydraulic Fracturing (Oct. 6, 2015),
water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/wells_hydrowhat
.cfm [https://perma.cc/ZRW7-J8GE] (providing a general background on hydraulic
fracturing).
2. Hallowich v. Range Resources Corp., No. 2010-3954, 2012 WL 7992901
(Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 2, 2012).
3. Id. at *2; see also Transcript of In-Chambers Proceeding Before the
Honorable Paul Pozonsky at 4, 15, Hallowich v. Range Res. Corp., 2012 WL 7992901
(Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 2, 2012) (No. 2010-3954), ae3b703522cf9ac6c40a32964bea949fe02d45161cf7095bfea9.r89.cf2.rackcdn.com/2013/211/626/pgs e tt l e me n t - h e a r i n g - t r a n s cr ip t .p d f [ h t t p s :/ / p e r ma . cc / 5 K 6 X - U X3 4 ]
[hereinafter, Settlement Hearing Transcript].
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prevent not only Chris and Stephanie, but also their children, from
discussing fracking ever again.4
To put into perspective how dramatic this can be for someone in the
Hallowich family’s position, it is helpful to think about the area of the
country in which the suit took place. Before execution of the settlement,
the Hallowich family lived on a farm located on the Marcellus Shale in
Mount Pleasant, Pennsylvania.5 The Marcellus Shale is one of the most
significant fracking regions in the United States. Further, fracking plays a
large role in the area’s economy and living environment.6 Similar to
football in Southern Louisiana, fracking is an important fixture in the
society and culture of the Mount Pleasant, Pennsylvania region. As a result
of the settlement, Nathan and Alyson have to live the remainder of their
lives unable to discuss a major part of their childhood. The many
encounters with fracking these children experienced as a result of living in
an environment dominated by the oil industry and the resulting lawsuit
cannot be spoken of or shared with anyone.
This type of agreement—one where parents settle away their
children’s ability to speak of a lawsuit in which they had no control—has
created quite the controversy. The Hallowich case grabbed national
attention and left many wondering how parents could be allowed to
contract away their children’s right to freedom of speech. Many scholars
suggest that the settlement is illegal,7 yet they are unsure as to what exactly
makes it so. Further, while still approving the settlement, the court
recognized the issue; addressing the counsel for the Hallowich family it
stated: “Nor does the Court have an answer for you, and I would agree
with counsel that I don’t know. That’s a law school question, I guess.”8
An agreement similar to that described above is unprecedented, and
there is no express violation of any particular law serving as grounds to
invalidate it. Nevertheless, an agreement to bargain a child’s constitutional
right is illegal. This Article will prove this assertion by analyzing the
precepts from contract and constitutional law, along with those from
public policy. Additionally, this Article will provide a solution to prevent
the issues exemplified in Hallowich by tailoring court procedures to serve
4. Id.
5. Suzanne Goldenberg, Children Given Lifelong Ban on Talking About
Fracking, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 5, 2013, theguardian.com/environment/2013/aug/05
/children-ban-talking-about-fracking?CMP=share_btn_link.
6. Alex Chamberlain, Why the Marcellus Shale is Important for US Oil and
Gas, YAHOO FINANCE (Dec. 22, 2014), finance.yahoo.com/news/why-marcellus
-shale-important-us-152716407.html [https://perma.cc/6MZK-KU9Q].
7. See Caitlyn Dickson, Can You Silence a Child? Inside the Hallowich Case
(Sept. 1, 2013, 3:45 AM), thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/09/01/can-you-silence-a
-child-inside-the-hallowich-case.html [https://perma.cc/8LFF-7J3S].
8. Settlement Hearing Transcript, supra note 3, at 12.
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the interests of minors in settlement agreements with oil and gas
companies. This Article will also advance the interests of oil and gas
companies, as the proposed solution will likewise provide greater security
for oil and gas companies in settlement agreements involving minors.
Part I of this Article will briefly discuss fracking operations and
settlement agreements. It will then analyze Hallowich, which illustrates
the dilemma that this Article addresses—the constitutionality of an
agreement executed by parents to waive their children’s fundamental
rights. Part II will discuss both public policy and statutory law as they
relate to parental authority to contractually bind minor children. Part III
will review three state action cases that serve as the prelude to this
Article’s proposed solution concerning confidentiality clauses in
settlement agreements, particularly those in fracking cases which bind
minor children. Part IV will propose a solution to the issue presented by
suggesting that the state and local trial courts have more authority in the
enforcement process of settlement agreements between private parties and
oil and gas companies to further the interests of minors involved in such
agreements.
The Hallowich family is not the only one bound to a confidentiality
agreement after agreeing to settle a civil suit with an oil and gas company.9
Rather, there have been cases from Pennsylvania and Wyoming, as well as
from many other regions of the country where the oil industry is prevalent.10
I. THE DILEMMA
The agreement reached in the Hallowich suit presents a dilemma
regarding whether a child’s constitutional rights be contracted away. Before
addressing this dilemma, a brief background into the importance of
confidentiality agreements in the oil and gas arena will be given, followed by
an analysis concerning the controversial agreement involving the Hallowich
children.
A. Oil and Gas Settlements and the Need for Confidentiality Agreements
Marc Bern, a prominent New York attorney, stated that in “virtually
all” of the settlements he has handled where the oil and gas company paid
money to the plaintiff, the company has demanded a confidentiality

9. Jim Efstathiou, Jr. & Mark Drajem, Drillers Silence Fracking Claims with
Sealed Settlements, BLOOMBERG, June 5, 2013, bloomberg.com/news/articles/201306-06/drillers-silence-fracking-claims-with-sealed-settlements [https://perma.cc
/U9LS-TC38].
10. Id.
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agreement.11 Bern believes that oil and gas companies settle because they
do not want information regarding procedures and chemicals used by the
fracking companies to be released to the public. Thus, these companies’
willingness to settle is contingent upon the plaintiff’s promise not to
disclose any information about the case or the company.12
The majority of tort cases involving oil and gas companies result in
settlements.13 These settlements are usually reached outside of court,14 and
typically contain confidentiality clauses that prohibit the parties from
discussing the contents of the settlement or details of the case.15 Plaintiffs who
sign these agreements often promise to never disclose information about their
injuries, the settlement provisions, or the fracking industry.16 These
confidentiality clauses are private contractual agreements, and courts
generally allow private parties to agree to whatever terms they wish.17 Thus,
it is permissible for oil and gas companies to add confidentiality clauses into
their settlement agreements if the other party so agrees.18 In fact, oil and gas
companies consider the addition of a confidentiality clause to be an essential
right, and often settle without having an extensive confidentiality agreement
signed by the plaintiff.19 The plaintiff’s promise not to disclose information is
very important to oil and gas companies because most of the companies claim
the chemicals used in fracking operations to be trade secrets. Therefore, they
do not want that information disclosed to the public.20
B. The Hallowich Suit
On May 27, 2011, Christopher and Stephanie Hallowich entered into
a settlement agreement with Range Resources, Williams Gas/Laurel

11. Id. Marc Bern is an attorney with Mark J. Bern & Partners LLP in New York
and has negotiated numerous fracking settlements for homeowners; see also MARK J.
BERN & PARTNERS LLP, http://www.bernripka.com [https://perma.cc/2TH4-EV8X]
(last visited Sept. 14, 2016).
12. Efstathiou, Jr., supra note 9.
13. Id. The Ruggieros and residents of Dimock Township agreed to settlement
agreements with oil and gas companies. See also Brief of Amici Curiae Philadelphia
Physicians for Social Responsibility, et al. at 23, Hallowich v. Range Res. Corp., 64
A.3d 13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (Nos. 234 WDA 2012, 235 WDA 2012), earthjustice
.org/sites/default/files/Hallowich_Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/CGD9 -9JMG].
14. Efstathiou, Jr., supra note 8.
15. Id.
16. Kellie Fisher, Communities in the Dark: The Use of State Sunshine Laws to
Shed Light on the Fracking Industry, 42 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 99, 116–20 (2015).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 119.
20. Id. at 100.
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Mountain Midstream, and MarkWest Energy Group.21 The settlement
arose subsequent to the Hallowich family filing suit against the oil
companies for injury-related damages resulting from the companies’
hydraulic fracturing operations conducted on the property adjacent to the
family’s farm land.22 The Hallowich family alleged that the oil and gas
companies destroyed their farmland located on the Marcellus Shale.
Further, they alleged that the fracking chemicals contaminated their water
supply which caused burning eyes, headaches, and sore throats.23
Additionally, they averred that the companies threatened the long-term
health of their two children.24
Similar to the resolution of most tort cases involving oil and gas
companies, the parties agreed to settle for $750,000. Further, the
settlement contained a confidentiality agreement prohibiting the parties
from discussing the contents of the case. It explicitly prohibited the
Hallowich family from speaking to anyone about the Marcellus Shale or
hydraulic fracturing activities for the rest of their lives.25 This
confidentiality agreement also bound the Hallowich’s minor children, who
were ages five and nine at the time of the settlement.26 The Hallowiches
explained to the court that they agreed to the confidentiality agreement
because they wanted to move away from the gas fields and live in a safer
environment for their two children.27
It is rather unusual for a confidentiality agreement to apply to children
like it did in the Hallowich settlement. Settlement agreements are contracts
and thus, minors have the right to invalidate contracts to which they are
parties.28 Furthermore, it is important to note that a confidentiality clause
can never be legal consideration29 for an agreement to settle a minor’s
claim. This is because the settlement of a minor’s claim requires court

21. Hallowich v. Range Res. Corp., No. 2010-3954, 2012 WL 7992901 (Pa. Ct.
Com. Pl. Apr. 2, 2012).
22. Id.
23. Goldenberg, supra note 5.
24. Id.
25. Brief of Amici Curiae Philadelphia Physicians for Social Responsibility, et
al. at 23, Hallowich v. Range Res. Corp., 64 A.3d 13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (Nos. 234
WDA 2012, 235 WDA 2012), earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/Hallowich_Brief.pdf
[https://perma.cc/77SC-R4NM].
26. Id. at 5.
27. Goldenberg, supra, note 5.
28. Aditi Mukherji, Does Fracking Settlement’s Gag Order Apply to Kids?,
FINDLAW (Aug. 2, 2013, 9:32 AM), blogs.findlaw.com/legally_weird/2013/08/doesfracking-settlements-gag-order-apply-to-kids.html [https://perma.cc/VB75-HAPQ].
29. Consideration is the essential reason for a party entering into a contract,
and must be a benefit bargained for by both parties to the agreement.
Consideration defined, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
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approval30 and court proceedings are a matter of public record.31 As such,
the Hallowich settlement should have been held invalid.
II. CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS–PARENTS’ RIGHT TO CONTRACT FOR
THEIR MINOR CHILDREN
A settlement is a contract, therefore, the principles of contract law apply.
Like any other contract, a settlement must be supported by consideration.32
Consideration refers to “a bargained-for exchange of promises or
performances and may consist of a promise, an act, or a forbearance.”33
The common law of contracts suggests that the mere agreement to
settle a dispute is enough to constitute consideration for the purpose of
making a settlement agreement enforceable.34 However, practitioners must
be attentive to the statutes governing consideration in the jurisdiction in
which the contract is being executed, as some jurisdictions require specific
elements of consideration to be met in order to make a contract enforceable
while others do not.35 Furthermore, the contract must be entered into in
good faith.36 Good faith bargaining is a chief concern with consideration.
It is an element courts examine when a party to the settlement agreement
raises the issue of lack of consideration.37
A. Limits on Parents Binding Minors–During Minority
Generally, minors (children) can enter into contracts.38 However, due
to their incapacity,39 the law protects children in contracts by making the

30. See discussion infra Part II.
31. Storms ex rel. Storms v. O’Malley, 779 A.2d 548, 568 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
32. RICHARD A. ROSEN ET AL., SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN COMMERCIAL
DISPUTES § 5.06 (2016).
33. Id. (quoting Federico v. Freedomroads RV, Inc., No. 09-CV-2027, 2010
WL 4740181, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2010) (internal quotations marks omitted));
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14.
39. The inability for a minor to bind themselves to a contract due to their lack of
competence. See McCrary v. City of Odessa, 482 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Tex.1972).
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agreements voidable40 until the child reaches majority.41 Contract law and
public policy indicates that parents do not have the right to contract on
behalf of their child based merely on the parental relationship.42 Rather,
the basis for doing so must be authorized by statute, and most states’
statutes that regulate settlements concerning minors mandate that the
settlement be approved by a court in the jurisdiction where the contract
was executed.43 This rule was designed to serve as a check on the authority
of parents and attorneys when making decisions involving a minor’s legal
interest. Here, the court acts as the final decision-maker to secure the
child’s best interest.44 While in many states a parent cannot agree to a
settlement and waive his or her child’s cause of action without prior court
approval,45 there are other states that do not require any court approval to
enforce contracts concerning minors.46
Generally, courts have held that parents cannot bind a child to an
agreement or waive their rights unless authorized to do so by statute.47 The
common law maintains that parents cannot release a child’s cause of action
before or after an injury occurs, nor can they bind their child to an
agreement to arbitrate their child’s potential causes of action.48 From these
common law standards, it is clear that parents cannot bind their child to a
contract or waive their child’s rights absent judicial approval. For this
reason, the Hallowiches and the defendant oil companies were required to
obtain the Pennsylvania trial court’s approval of the settlement.49
The law, however, does maintain an exception to the rule requiring
court approval for the medical care of the minor—parents do have the right
to contract for their children when it comes to the health of the child.50 A
Florida appellate court in Shea v. Global Travel Marketing, Inc. referred
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 (defining voidable contract as
a contract “where one or more parties have the power . . . to avoid the legal relations
created by the contract, or by ratification of the contract to extinguish the power of
avoidance.”).
41. ROSEN ET AL., supra note 30, at § 6.07; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 14 (stating that “[u]nless a statute provides otherwise, a natural person
has the capacity to incur only voidable contractual duties until the beginning of the
day before the person’s eighteenth birthday.”).
42. ROSEN ET AL., supra note 30, at § 6.07.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. See also LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 4265 (2016); 231 PA. CODE §
2039 (2016).
46. Infra, Part II(D)(ii).
47. E.g., Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Co., 48 P.3d 1229, 1233 (Colo. 2002); Shea v.
Global Travel Mktg., Inc., 870 So. 2d 20, 23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
48. Cooper, 48 P. 3d 1229, 1233; Shea, 870 So. 3d 20, 23–25.
49. 231 PA. CODE § 2039 (2016)
50. Shea, 870 So. 2d at 24.
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to this as the “common sense” exception.51 The court opined that no one
would possibly know and understand a child’s health needs better than a
parent of that child.52 Therefore, other than to provide for the medical care
of the child, the general rule is that parents have no right to contract or
waive their child’s rights without obtaining prior court approval.53
B. Limits on Parents Binding Minors Into Majority
Ordinarily, contracts with minors are voidable once they reach
majority.54 Thus, the child can invalidate a contract within a reasonable
time after reaching the requisite age to be considered an adult.55 However,
once the appropriate court has approved the settlement contract, the
contract with the minor becomes binding.56 The child thus cannot
invalidate the agreement once he or she becomes an adult, unless the
hearing held to review the agreement was deemed inadequate to support
the interest of the minor.57 In other words, if the court that reviews the
agreement deems it to be in the best interest of the child and approves it,
the minor cannot subsequently invalidate the settlement.58 Yet, if there is
no court approval, the minor or his or her guardian has the right to
renounce the agreement.59 Therefore, had the Hallowich settlement not
been approved by the appropriate court, the Hallowich children could have
simply invalidated the agreement upon reaching majority. Obtaining court
approval is an important part of the settlement process, and attorneys
representing oil and gas companies not aware of this procedure can
potentially cause clients to lose out on settlement agreements due to the
risk that the involved minors may later invalidate these agreements.
This concept is illustrated in Sullivan v. Department of
Transportation, a 1992 Florida District Court case where a woman’s
husband and her children brought suit for damages resulting from the
woman’s death in a car accident.60 The case settled without going to trial,
and the settlement arrangement provided for monthly installments to be
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. ROSEN ET AL., supra note 30, at § 6.07.
54. Halbman v. Lemke, 298 N.W.2d 562, 564 (1980).
55. LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 10:1 (Thomas R. Young ed., 3d ed. 2015).
56. Childs By and Through Harvey v. Williams, 757 P.2d 302, 303 (Kan. 1988).
57. White v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 31 P.3d 328 (Kan. App. 2d. 2001).
58. Id.
59. Y.G. v. Riverside Unified Sch.. Dist., No. EDCV 10-1002, 2012 WL
2153957, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2012); see also Pearson v. Superior Ct. of San Luis
Obispo Cnty., 202 Cal. App. 4th 1333, 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d 455 (2012).
60. Tom Barber, Settling Claims Involving Minors, 69 FLA. B. J. 10, 10–19
(1995).
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paid to the husband with a separate amount to be paid to the children.61
Because the agreement was not approved by a court of competent
jurisdiction, the court held that the family was able to bring a subsequent
wrongful death action against the defendant.62 Because the defendant’s
legal counsel did not raise the issue of court approval, the defendant was
susceptible to being sued and at risk of paying a much higher damage
award to the family. Thus, the interests of both the minors and the
opposing party are better served when the attorneys for both sides seek
court approval at the outset during settlement discussions.63
C. The Civil Law Perspective
In Louisiana—a state governed by the civil law of obligations—a
settlement is referred to as a compromise.64 A compromise is “a contract
whereby the parties, through concessions made by one or more of them, settle
a dispute or an uncertainty concerning an obligation or other legal
relationship.”65
While the law concerning settlements with minors in the civil law is
similar to the common law, one minor difference exists. The civil law dictates
that with any settlement agreement made on behalf of a minor, the court must
both approve the compromise involving a minor and determine whether the
terms of the proposed compromise are in the minor’s best interests.66
This procedural rule is designed to protect the interests of minors while
affording protection to those who contract with minors. This principle is
relatively consistent with most common law jurisdictions. Additionally,
Louisiana jurisprudence and the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provide
that any agreement to waive a minor’s rights, or any contract entered into on
a minor’s behalf without court approval, is null and without any legal effect.67
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 18.
64. Trask v. Lewis, 258 So.2d 603, 605 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/31/72).
65. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3071 (2016). There is no major difference between
a common law settlement and a civil law compromise, as the two are used
interchangeably and the Louisiana Civil Code equates one with the other. See Trask,
258 So.2d at 605 (stating that “[s]ettlement must be equated with compromise”).
66. Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000, 1009 (5th Cir. 1998); LA. CODE CIV.
PROC. ANN. art. 4265; see also discussion infra Part III.
67. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 4265; see also Chambers v. Chambers, 6 So.
659 (La. 1889). Additionally, Louisiana has a special exception to its court approval
requirement. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:196 allows for the parent of a minor to settle a claim
or relinquish a minor’s rights without judicial approval as long as the claim is valued
at less than $10,000. If the claim is valued at more than $10,000, then the settlement
must be approved by the appropriate and competent court. See also, Bowen v. Smith,
885 So. 2d 1, 3–4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/8/04).
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Another difference between civil and common law regarding court
approval is illustrated by the effect on the settlement once it has been
nullified for lack of compliance with the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure.68 In the common law, when the appropriate court has not approved
the settlement, the minor can invalidate the agreement as to himself.69 While
the agreement will no longer have any legal effect on the minor, other parties
to the agreement may still be bound. In the civil law, however, when a contract
is declared null by the court, it is deemed to have never existed.70 All of the
parties to the agreement will be restored to their positions prior to the existence
of the contract.71 If complete restoration is not possible, the parties can be
made whole through an award of damages.72
D. Public Policy Standards on Contracts with Minors
The term public policy is not easily defined.73 To some, it denotes the
common sense ideologies or principles that are applied to public state matters
such as the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the state.74 To others,
it is the system that governs a multitude of legal issues, including those
involving contracts.75 As public policy targeting contracts varies among
states, examination of these different policy standards provide insight into
why legislation that regulates contracts involving minors exist.
The goal among the states concerning settlements involving minors is
to protect the overall interests of the minor. However, differences exist
among the states in regard to the regulatory procedure governing these
settlements. One of the primary inconsistencies is the question of who is
allowed to represent the minor at the approval hearing. The policy on this
issue varies among states, with each state handling the issue in one of three
ways: 1) allow the parent or legal guardian of the minor to represent the
child; 2) allow for the minor’s attorney to stand in as the representative; or
3) have the court appoint the representative itself. These policies can be
analyzed on a spectrum, with states favoring the appointment of
representatives for the minor on one end, and states favoring the allowance
of the parents or legal guardians to represent the minor on the other. Lying

68.
69.
2001).
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 4265.
Storms ex rel. Storms v. O’Malley, 779 A.2d 548, 555–56 (Pa. Super. Ct.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2033 (2016); see also Bowen, 885 So. 2d at 5.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2033.
Id.
Harris v. Gonzalez, 789 So. 2d 405, 409 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id.
Id.
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in the middle are the states that want to preserve some parental authority
while allowing the judiciary to oversee the settlement process.
1. Missouri, Michigan, and Alabama
Missouri, Michigan, and Alabama are three of several states that
represent the extreme “protective” view on the policy spectrum and favor
the appointment of representatives for minors in settlement hearings.
In Missouri, courts typically require that parents be judicially appointed
to represent their own child at the settlement approval hearings.76 The
Missouri Supreme Court held in Braughton v. Esurance Insurance Company
that “even though a parent generally has the interests of his child at heart, ‘this
does not mean a parent in all cases is qualified to represent his child in
litigation.’”77 The reasoning behind the Missouri Supreme Court’s assertion
is not entirely illogical. Missouri’s sole concern is protecting the interests of
children involved in these settlements.78 This gives the court authority to
determine whether the parent is qualified to represent his or her child in the
matter.79 Thus, this policy prevents conflicts of interest and provides for a
knowledgeable and capable representative to ensure an outcome that is in the
best interest of the child.80
Similarly, in Michigan and Alabama, a parent has no authority, merely
due to their status as the parent, to waive, release, or compromise claims on
behalf of his or her child.81 The policy in both of these states requires a parent
to first obtain court approval in order to bind a minor to a settlement
agreement.82 The goal of this judicial approval requirement is to ensure that
the minor’s interests are being properly attended to in the settlement
proceedings.83
2. New York
New York is an example of a state on the opposite end of the spectrum.
States like New York favor policies that allow parents or guardians to

76. Braughton v. Esurance Ins. Co., 466 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2015),
reh’g denied (Apr. 28, 2015).
77. Id. at 12.
78. Id. at 13.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Woodman v. Kera, LLC, 760 N.W.2d 641, 652 (Mich. App. 2008); see also
J.T. ex rel. Thode v. Monster Mountain, LLC, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1326 (M.D. Ala.
2010).
82. Thode, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1326.
83. Id.
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represent their minor children at settlement hearings without court approval.84
Further, New York courts cannot amend the terms of a settlement agreement
consented to by a minor’s parent or guardian on behalf of their child.85 The
only jurisdictional requirement is that some basis exist to show that the
settlement is in the best interest of the child.86 This relaxed standard does not
indicate that New York lacks concern for the interests of children; rather, it
demonstrates that the New York courts place greater confidence in the
parents’ knowledge of what is best for their child.
3. Colorado, Florida, and Other States in the Middle of the Spectrum
In the middle of the policy spectrum are states that neither seek to
bolster nor to limit a parent’s right to represent their children in settlement
proceedings. Instead, these states—such as Colorado, Florida, and several
others—are content with allowing parents, guardians, or the minor’s
attorney to represent the child in the proceedings.87 However, these states
also prefer that the courts have enough authority to oversee the entire
process and to ensure that the minor’s welfare and legal interests are being
protected throughout the process.
In Colorado, public policy protects minors from being bound to
agreements that waive their cause of action for injury-related claims.88 It
is the policy of each state to impose a duty upon its courts to “exercise a
watchful and protecting care over a minor’s interests, and not permit his
rights to be waived, prejudiced or surrendered either by his own acts, or
by the admissions or pleadings of those who act for him.” 89
Like Colorado, Florida’s policy seeks to further the best interests of
minors by requiring judicial approval to validate settlements involving
minors.90 Florida also imposes a monetary requirement in addition to its
judicial approval requirement,91 prohibiting a minor child’s parents from
binding the minor to a settlement with a value exceeding $15,000 without
prior court approval.92 While Florida policy recognizes that parents have
broad authority over their children, it also asserts that the State has greater

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Glenn ex rel. Fraser v. Jones, 796 N.Y.S. 2d 230, 231 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005).
Id.
Id.
Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Co., 48 P.3d. 1229, 1231 (Colo. 2002).
Id.
Id. at 1234–35.
Shea v. Global Travel Mktg., 870 So.2d. 20, 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
Id.
Id.
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authority as the “parens patriae”93 and thus can deem any contract or
settlement unenforceable if it runs contrary to public policy.94
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the parens patriae power in
Prince v. Massachusetts95 when it held that, although there exists a
fundamental right of parents to make decisions pertaining to the care,
custody, and control of their minor children, the state, as parens patriae,
may intervene and require, mandate or regulate whatever is deemed
necessary to protect the interest of the minor.96 In Cooper v. Aspen Skiing
Co.,97 the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that a parental release of a
child’s cause of action is “not of the same character and quality as those
rights recognized as implicating parents’ fundamental liberty interest in
the ‘care, custody and control’ of their children.”98 Significantly, the court
in Cooper specified that this conclusion was not inconsistent with the due
process right of parental decision-making recognized in Prince.99
4. Where Louisiana Falls on the Spectrum
Louisiana’s policy on settlements involving minors falls directly in the
middle of the spectrum. Similar to most common law states, public policy
in Louisiana recognizes that a minor should be protected in his or her
contractual relationships. This notion is expressly stated in Louisiana’s
Code of Civil Procedure article 4265.100 Article 4265 mandates that a
competent court approve all settlement agreements concerning minor
children.101 Like Colorado and Florida, Louisiana’s standard does not
promote nor limit the rights of parents. Rather, it simply uses the court as
a check on the parent’s authority.102
93. Parens Patriae is the Latin translation for “parent of the nation.” This
doctrine allows a state to intervene in any action that violates the health, safety, or
welfare of its citizenry. Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, Class Actions in the
Gulf South Symposium: State Attorney General Actions, the Tobacco Litigation, and
the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859, 1863 (2000).
94. Global Travel Mktg., Inc. v. Shea, 908 So. 2d. 392, 399 (Fla. 2005).
95. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
96. Shea, 908 So. 2d at 399; see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 2054 (2000).
97. 48 P.3d 1229 (Colo.2002).
98. Id. at 1235 n.11.
99. Id. at 400.
100. Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 323 So. 2d 120, 125 (La. 1975); LA. CODE CIV.
PROC. ANN. art. 4265.
101. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 4265. As was mentioned in the previous
section, Louisiana requires settlements entered into on behalf of a minor to be
approved by a competent court in the appropriate jurisdiction if the value of the
settlement is in excess of the allotted amount set forth in the LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:196.
102. Wilkinson, 323 So.2d at 125.
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Common and civil law jurisdictions indicate a consensus that the
overarching goal of any settlement agreement involving a minor is to obtain
what is in his or her best interests. This assertion strongly suggests that the
Hallowich agreement is in violation of public policy. Although the settlement
was approved in accordance with Pennsylvania law, the court failed its duty
to make sure the agreement was in the best legal interests of the children.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF SETTLEMENTS
INVOLVING MINORS
Now that the contract law analysis has been explored, it is important to
address the potential constitutional rights issues involved in the Hallowich
settlement. Due to the settlement prohibiting the Hallowich children from
speaking about fracking, the analysis will focus primarily on the right to
freedom of speech.
A. State Action Analysis
Constitutional provisions generally do not apply to the actions of private
parties.103 Therefore, in order to raise a constitutional rights violation—such
as a violation of the First Amendment right to Freedom of Speech—there
must be some state action involved.104 Accordingly, in order to perform a
proper constitutional rights violation analysis, a state action analysis should
first be made to determine whether some state action exists.105
Three paramount cases on the issue of state action are Shelley v.
Kraemer,106 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company,107 and Cohen v.
Cowles Media Company.108 Each of these cases is important to a state action
analysis as they demonstrate different vehicles by which a plaintiff can show
that state action exists for the purpose of raising a constitutional rights
violation. Thus, each of these cases will be addressed, analyzed, and
compared to the facts of the Hallowich case in order to determine if state
action exists in the enforcement of the Hallowich settlement.
1. Shelley v. Kraemer
Kraemer involved a suit brought by Louis Kraemer and his wife against
J.D. Shelley and his wife to enforce restrictive covenants against the
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991).
Id.
Id. at 620.
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 619.
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).

2017]

A “MINOR” PROBLEM

223

occupancy or ownership of property by African Americans.109 Shelley, an
African American, argued that the covenant violated his Fourteenth
Amendment rights.110 The Supreme Court then had to determine whether a
state action existed in order to address Shelley’s claim.111 The Supreme Court
opined that a State may act through different agencies—through its legislative,
executive or judicial authority—and that any action by the State under one of
their branches constitutes an action of the State.112 The Court concluded that
the enforcement of property interests by the judiciary would amount to state
action; thus, this power must be exercised within the boundaries defined by
the Fourteenth Amendment.113
Whether Kraemer applies to the Hallowich situation is uncertain.
Kraemer holds that the enforcement of property interests by the judiciary
constitutes state action.114 In order to fit the facts of the Hallowich case under
Kraemer, the argument is that because the settlement agreement called for the
transfer of the Hallowich property, and a Pennsylvania trial court enforced the
settlement, that there was an enforcement of property interests by the judicial
system. With that said, the transfer of the home was not what the court was
enforcing. Rather, it enforced the confidentiality agreement that was in need
of approval due to the concern for the minor children. Both of these arguments
are not without merit, but, it is wise to consider other state action precedent
before drawing the conclusion whether state action exists in this case under
the Kraemer standard.
2. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company,115 also decided by the
Supreme Court, provides another useful state action analysis. In Edmonson, a
black construction worker was injured in a job-site accident.116 He
subsequently sued the concrete company for negligence.117 During voir
dire,118 the defendant used two of three peremptory challenges to remove
African Americans from the prospective jury.119 The issue before the Court
109. Shelly, 334 U.S. at 6.
110. Id. at 7.
111. Id. at 13.
112. Id. at 14.
113. Id. at 20.
114. Id.
115. 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991).
116. Id. at 616.
117. Id.
118. The voir dire stage of trial is used as “a preliminary examination of a
prospective juror by a judge or lawyer to decide whether the prospect is qualified and
suitable to serve on a jury.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
119. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 616.

224

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. V

was whether the defendant’s actions during voir dire amounted to that of
a state action, which would have allowed for Edmonson to raise an equal
protection claim.120 The Supreme Court held that the defendant’s use of
peremptory challenges in district court was state action.121 In its reasoning,
the Court determined that because peremptory challenges are useless
outside of a courtroom, are regulated by state statute, and are administered
by judges, their use clearly constitutes state action.122
On one hand, because the Supreme Court’s reasoning and holding in
Edmonson is much broader than it was in Kraemer, it is easier to apply
Edmonson’s state action analysis to Hallowich. In Hallowich, a judge
approved the settlement agreement between the Hallowich family and the
defendant oil companies. The judicial act of approval in Hallowich is the
same state action that the Court in Edmonson sought to include in its
holding. Although they may intended it, the Supreme Court did not
specifically state any intent to limit their ruling to peremptory challenges.
Rather, the Court’s reasoning was founded on the fact that a government
official, in this instance a judge, was involved in the administering of the
procedure.123 Therefore, due to the presence of a government official
administering his approval of the Hallowich settlement under the authority
of the judicial system of the state, Edmonson applies and the presence of
a state action exists.
To further the argument for the existence of state action under
Edmonson, not only do the judges and courts play a role in approving
settlements concerning minors, state statutes are what authorize them to
do so. The state statute, the court, and the judge are all involved in the
process, quite similar to what was seen in Edmonson.
The Hallowich settlement ended up in court so that the parties would
be in compliance with Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2039. This
article is similar to Louisiana’s Code of Civil Procedure requirement,124
and requires all settlements involving minors in the state of Pennsylvania
to be approved in court.125 This rule’s primary purpose is to “prevent
settlements which are unfair to minors, and to ensure that the minor
receives the benefit of the money awarded.”126 The enforcement of the
settlement agreements in accordance with these statutes would clearly fall
under Edmonson and state action would exist in the Hallowich settlement.

120.
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124.
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Id. at 620.
Id. at 628.
Id. at 622.
Id.
See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 4265 (2016).
231 PA. CODE § 2039.
Storms v. O’Malley, 779 A.2d 548, 556 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
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3. Cohen v. Cowles Media Company
A final state action case that is beneficial to examine is Cohen v. Cowles
Media Company.127 In this Supreme Court case, the plaintiff had provided
certain information to the defendant’s newspaper company after receiving
promises of confidentiality from the defendant’s reporters.128 The defendant
then revealed the plaintiff as the informant, breaching confidentiality.129 The
plaintiff subsequently brought an action against the newspaper company for
fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract.130 The Supreme Court
held that the enforcement of the promises made to the plaintiff would violate
the defendant’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech, since
compelling the confidentiality agreement would place a limitation on their
right of speech.131 The Court determined that this was enough to establish state
action for the purposes of the First Amendment.132
Cohen provides a strong argument that state action existed in the
Hallowich case. In both the Hallowich settlement and Cohen, the courts were
asked to enforce a settlement agreement, which contained confidentiality
clauses. Because confidentiality clauses restrict speech, they often raise First
Amendment considerations. The constitutional “violation” at issue in the
Hallowich settlement is that the Hallowich parents essentially waived their
children’s First Amendment right of Freedom of Speech in the confidentiality
agreement. By applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Cohen, state action
is present and analysis for a violation of the Hallowich children’s First
Amendment rights should commence.
B. Waivers of Constitutional Rights in Settlement Agreements
The law on waivers clearly provides that individuals can decide to
waive their own constitutional rights, so long as the required factors for an
enforceable waiver are met.133 The Hallowich parents agreed to waive their
rights to freedom of speech when they signed the confidentiality clause.
The problem is that the Hallowich parents also waived their minor
children’s rights. This issue raises the inquiry of whether a person can
waive the constitutional rights of another person—particularly a minor.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

501 U.S. 663 (1991).
Id. at 665.
Id. at 666.
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Id. at 667.
Perricone v. Perricone, 972 A.2d 666, 680 (Conn. 2009).
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A waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege.134 The waiver must be made with the full knowledge of
the right, along with the awareness of the circumstances and consequences
of waiving that right.135 Federal law controls the inquiry into whether a
party has waived a federal provided-for constitutional right.136
In Perricone v. Perricone, a woman agreed to waive her First
Amendment right of freedom of speech when she signed a confidentiality
agreement and promised not to disclose information about her divorce
from her estranged husband.137 The Connecticut Supreme Court held that
a promise to keep information confidential constitutes a valid waiver of
one’s First Amendment rights.138 Furthermore, Perricone discussed the
effect of such waivers on public policy. The Court stated that even when
a waiver of rights is made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, public
policy must also be considered as an additional factor as to whether the
waiver should be given full effect.139 A waiver may be deemed
unenforceable if the interests in its enforcement are outweighed by the
harm done to public policy from the enforcement of the agreement.140
Generally, situations similar to Perricone—where an individual agrees
to remain silent and waive his or her First Amendment rights—are quite
common. This is particularly true in settlement agreements involving oil
and gas companies.141 The dilemma in Hallowich, however, is
unprecedented as the parents agreed to waive their children’s rights rather
than just their own. Despite the absence of law to provide an answer to the
Hallowich dilemma, a solution can be drawn from analogies to public
policy and from the laws on waivers.
Since waivers are required to be made knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily, it is highly doubtful that a child could validly waive his or her
right to free speech. It is unlikely that the Hallowich children, or any child
in general, would understand what their rights are, much less understand
the concept of constitutional rights. Even if they did, it is even less likely
that they would understand the full consequences resulting from such a
waiver. Stephanie Hallowich, the children’s mother, stated that even she
did not completely understand the extent to which her children’s rights had
been surrendered.142 If the children’s mother did not understand the full
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966).
137. Perricone, 972 A.2d at 671.
138. Id. at 681–83.
139. Id. at 687 (citing Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1099
(3d Cir. 1988)).
140. Id.
141. Fisher, supra note 15, at 117–20.
142. Goldenberg, supra, note 4.
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extent of the consequences, then it easily follows that the children did not
understand themselves.
Moreover, the law on waivers includes public policy as a factor to
ensure the appropriateness of any waiver agreement.143 As discussed
previously, the public policy of most states weighs strongly in support of
the best interests of the children144 by preventing a guardian or parent from
waiving a minor’s fundamental rights without prior court approval.145
When the public policy factor favoring the minor’s best interest is figured
into the waiver enforceability calculation, the scale leans heavily on the
side of unenforceability. The interests in enforcing the Hallowich
settlement do not outweigh the harm done to the public policy that exists
to protect minors from agreements like these. Therefore, if parents cannot
enter into an agreement to waive a child’s fundamental rights, then parents
have no authority in the law to waive a child’s constitutional right to
freedom of speech, because it is a true and fundamental right.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Public policy standards and contract law dictate that the interests of
minors are of the utmost importance. Therefore, those interests should be
protected to the full extent of the law. To protect children from being
harmed in contracts with oil and gas companies, states have required that
any settlement agreement in which a minor is involved be approved in
court.146 This alone, however, is not enough to protect the interests of the
parties on both sides. This judicial requirement was not enough to prevent
the Hallowich agreement from being enforced, and the Hallowich
children’s rights were waived as a result. More protection is necessary to
prevent agreements like the Hallowich settlement from harming minors in
the future. Also, for oil and gas companies, the issue with these current
protections afforded to minors is that they limit the amount of protection
that the drilling companies have in settlements involving minor children.
Rather than provide the courts with the authority to only approve the
settlements, courts should be given the authority to determine whether a
settlement is beneficial to the minor prior to giving its approval. This will
better serve the interests of the child, while also ensuring that the
settlement cannot be later invalidated because it was not beneficial to the
child. This solution will serve both sides equally by protecting the interests
of both the oil companies and minors.
143. Fisher, supra note 15, at 117–20; see also Perricone v. Perricone, 972 A.2d
666, 680 (Conn. 2009).
144. See supra Part II.D.
145. Romish v. Albo, 291 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974).
146. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 4265; 231 PA. CODE § 2039.
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This solution can be accomplished by providing trial courts with a
procedural test to follow before approving any settlement agreement
involving a minor. The Hallowich Test, an appropriate name for this
proposal, contains three prongs that must be met in order for the court to
approve the settlement. The first prong for the court to consider is whether
the agreement violates the enforcing state’s public policy. If the agreement
does not violate the state’s policy concerning settlements with minors, then
the court will proceed to the next analytical prong. The second prong
places a duty upon the court to examine the enforceability of the
settlement’s term.147 If the term of the agreement is not enforceable, then
the analysis stops and the court will not approve the settlement. If the term
is enforceable, however, the court will proceed to the third and final prong
of its analysis. This last prong serves as a balancing test to determine the
proportionality between the rights the minor relinquished and the benefit
received. Only if the court determines that the damage award is beneficial
to the minor and is proportionate to what the minor is giving up in the
agreement, may the court proceed to validate the settlement.
A. The First Prong: Compliance with Public Policy
The first prong of the Hallowich Test requires consideration of
whether the agreement violates the public policy of the state in which the
agreement is being enforced. In order to define what that state’s public
policy may be, the court should look to the state’s code of civil procedure
and the state’s statutes concerning contracts with minors. Once the court
has defined the relevant state’s policy regarding settlements with minors,
it must then determine whether the settlement is in compliance with that
policy. A court does not proceed to the next prong of the analysis if the
settlement fails this first prong.
B. The Second Prong: Enforceability of the Settlement’s Term
The second prong will require the court to decide whether the essential
term of the settlement is actually enforceable. The court must conclude
that it is reasonable to expect someone to adhere to the term and that the
term is legally enforceable. For example, attempting to bind a minor to an
agreement to never speak about fracking for the rest of his or her life is not
reasonable, as settlements of a minor’s claim requires court approval and
court proceedings are a matter of public record.148 Courts should not
147. Referring to a provision in a contract that gives rise to a contractual
obligation, the breach of which can give rise to litigation.
148. Storms v. O’Malley, 779 A.2d 548, 552 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
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approve these types of agreements. If the enforceability requirement is
satisfied, then the court will proceed to the third and final prong of the
analysis.
C. The Third Prong: A Balancing Test
If the prior two prongs have been met, the court will next have to
determine whether the value of what the minor is surrendering in the
agreement is proportional to the benefit that the minor is receiving in
return. This can be achieved by performing a balancing test. If, like in
Hallowich the minor is relinquishing a fundamental right only in exchange
for a small sum of money, the court should not approve the settlement. If,
however, the court determines that the damage award is beneficial to the
minor and proportionate to what the minor is giving up, then the court can
proceed to approve the settlement between the parties. The settlement will
be binding against both parties and cannot be invalidated.
Critics of this proposal could argue in support of the free market
society and suggest that this three-prong test gives courts too much
authority. This argument will likely be that individuals should have the
right to agree to whatever they want to in a contract, and not have courts
disapprove of that right. However, this proposal does not hinder the free
market society for contracts; rather, it promotes this notion. Giving courts
more authority in the enforcement of these settlements will provide greater
security for both sides, and as a result, will provide incentive for both sides
to come to an agreement with one another, rather than go to trial.
All parties win with this proposed change in the judicial approval
requirement, as minors will no longer have their constitutional rights
waived illegally by their guardians. Further, minor’s overall welfare in
these agreements will be better protected. As for oil and gas companies,
they will receive the benefit of having greater security in knowing that
their settlement agreements will be enforced and not invalidated.
CONCLUSION
Parents have the right to do many things on their child’s behalf,
however, agreeing to waive one of their child’s fundamental rights is not
among them. While the issue presented in Hallowich has remained
unsolved for several years, this “law school question” has now been
answered. An analysis of contract law, public policy, and constitutional
law provides the overwhelming consensus that the interests of minors are
of the utmost importance, especially in contractual relationships. Thus, an
agreement not in the best interest of the minor child will not be enforced
in any court. Hence, one may rest assured in knowing that his or her first
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amendment right to talk about LSU football cannot be waived by his or
her parents.
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